Anatomy of a Controversy - RFK and Dobrynin Meeting


Anatoly F. Dobrynin’s Meeting With Robert F. Kennedy, Saturday, 27 October 1962

by Jim Hershberg - Article online at The National Security Archive, George Washington University

If the Cuban Missile Crisis was the most dangerous passage of
the Cold War, the most dangerous moment of the Cuban Missile
Crisis was the evening of Saturday, 27 October 1962, when the
resolution of the crisis—war or peace—appeared to hang in the
balance.  While Soviet ships had not attempted to break the U.S.
naval blockade of Cuba, Soviet nuclear missile bases remained on
the island and were rapidly becoming operational, and pressure on
President Kennedy to order an air strike or invasion was mounting,
especially after an American U-2 reconnaissance plane was shot
down over Cuba that Saturday afternoon and its pilot killed.  Hopes
that a satisfactory resolution to the crisis could be reached between
Washington and Moscow had dimmed, moreover, when a letter
from Soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev arrived Saturday morning
demanding that the United States agree to remove its Jupiter
missiles from Turkey in exchange for a Soviet removal of missiles
from Cuba.  The letter struck U.S. officials as an ominous hardening
of the Soviet position from the previous day’s letter from
Khrushchev, which had omitted any mention of American missiles
in Turkey but had instead implied that Washington’s pledge not to
invade Cuba would be sufficient to obviate the need for Soviet
nuclear protection of Castro’s revolution.

On Saturday evening, after a day of tense discussions within the
“ExComm” or Executive Committee of senior advisers, President
Kennedy decided on a dual strategy—a formal letter to Khrushchev
accepting the implicit terms of his October 26 letter (a U.S. non-
invasion pledge in exchange for the verifiable departure of Soviet
nuclear missiles), coupled with private assurances to Khrushchev
that the United States would speedily take out its missiles from
Turkey, but only on the basis of a secret understanding, not as an
open agreement that would appear to the public, and to NATO
allies, as a concession to blackmail.  The U.S. president elected to
transmit this sensitive message through his brother, Attorney
General Robert F. Kennedy, who met in his office at the Justice
Department with Soviet ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin.

That meeting has long been recognized as a turning point in the
crisis, but several aspects of it have been shrouded in mystery and
confusion.  One concerned the issue of the Jupiter missiles in
Turkey: U.S. officials maintained that neither John nor Robert
Kennedy promised to withdraw the Jupiters as a quid pro quo, or
concession, in exchange for the removal of the Soviet missiles from
Cuba, or as part of an explicit agreement, deal, or pledge, but had
merely informed Dobrynin that Kennedy had planned to take out the
American missiles in any event.  This was the version of events
depicted in the first published account of the RFK-Dobrynin
meeting by one of the participants, in Robert F. Kennedy’s Thirteen
Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis, posthumously
published in 1969, a year after he was assassinated while seeking
the Democratic nomination for president.  While Thirteen Days
depicted RFK as rejecting any firm agreement to withdraw the
Jupiters, this was also the first public indication that the issue had
even been privately discussed.

With Dobrynin obviously unable to publish his own version—he
remained Moscow’s ambassador in Washington until 1986, and
Soviet diplomats were not in the habit of publishing tell-all exposés
prior to glasnost—the first important Soviet account of the event to
emerge was contained in the tape-recorded memoirs of deposed
Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev, which were smuggled to the West
and published in 1970 (after Khrushchev’s death, additional
installments saw print in the West in 1974 and 1990).  The account
of the RFK-Dobrynin meeting in Khrushchev Remembers, in the
form of a paraphrase from memory of Dobrynin’s report, did not
directly touch upon the secret discussions concerning the Jupiters,
but did raise eyebrows with its claim that Robert F. Kennedy had
fretted to Dobrynin that if his brother did not approve an attack on
Cuba soon, the American military might “overthrow him and seize
power.”  The second volume of Khrushchev’s memoirs
(Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament), published
posthumously in 1974, touched only briefly on the Robert Kennedy-
Dobrynin meeting, but included the flat statement (on p. 512) that
“President Kennedy said that in exchange for the withdrawl of our
missiles, he would remove American missiles from Turkey and
Italy,” although he described this “pledge” as “symbolic” since the
rockets “were already obsolete.”

Over the years, many scholars of the Cuban Missile Crisis came
strongly to suspect that Robert Kennedy had, in fact, relayed a
pledge from his brother to take out the Jupiters from Turkey in
exchange for the Soviet removal of nuclear missiles from Cuba, so
long as Moscow kept the swap secret; yet senior former Kennedy
Administration officials, such as then-National Security Advisor
McGeorge Bundy and then-Secretary of State Dean Rusk, continued
to insist that RFK had passed on no more than an informal
assurance rather than an explicit promise or agreement.

The first authoritative admission on the U.S. side that the
Jupiters had actually been part of a “deal” came at a conference in
Moscow in January 1989, after glasnost had led Soviet (and then
Cuban) former officials to participate in international scholarly
efforts to reconstruct and assess the history of the crisis.  At that
meeting, former Kennedy speechwriter Theodore Sorensen (and the
uncredited editor of Thirteen Days) admitted, after prodding from
Dobrynin, that he had taken it upon himself to edit out a “very
explicit” reference to the inclusion of the Jupiters in the final deal to
settle the crisis.

Now Dobrynin’s original, contemporaneous, and dramatic cable
of the meeting, alluded to in some accounts by Soviets (such as
Anatoly Gromyko, son of the late foreign minister) with special
access, has been declassified and is available at the archives of the
Russian Foreign Ministry.  It is reprinted in translation below, along
with relevant excerpts from the other publications mentioned above. 
The Dobrynin cable’s first publication in English, a copy obtained
by the Japanese television network NHK, came last year in an
appendix to We All Lost the Cold War, a study by Richard Ned
Lebow and Janice Stein, whose commentary is also excerpted.

* * * * *

Robert F. Kennedy’s (edited) Description

I telephoned Ambassador Dobrynin about 7:15 P.M. and asked
him to come to the Department of Justice.  We met in my office at
7:45.  I told him first that we knew that work was continuing on the
missile bases in Cuba and that in the last few days it had been
expedited.  I said that in the last few hours we had learned that our
reconnaissance planes flying over Cuba had been fired upon and
that one of our U-2s had been shot down and the pilot killed.  That
for us was a most serious turn of events.   

President Kennedy did not want a military conflict.  He had done
everything possible to avoid a military engagement with Cuba and
with the Soviet Union, but now they had forced our hand.  Because
of the deception of the Soviet Union, our photographic
reconnaissance planes would have to continue to fly over Cuba, and
if the Cubans or Soviets shot at these planes, then we would have to
shoot back.  This would inevitably lead to further incidents and to
escalation of the conflict, the implications of which were very grave

He said the Cubans resented the fact that we were violating
Cuban air space.  I replied that if we had not violated Cuban air
space, we would still be believing what Khrushchev had said—that
there would be no missiles placed in Cuba.  In any case, I said, this
matter was far more serious than the air space of Cuba—it involved
the peoples of both of our countries and, in fact, people all over the

The Soviet Union had secretly established missile bases in Cuba
while at the same time proclaiming privately and publicly that this
would never be done.  We had to have a commitment by tomorrow
that those bases would be removed.  I was not giving them an
ultimatum but a statement of fact.  He should understand that if they
did not remove those bases, we would remove them.  President
Kennedy had great respect for the Ambassador’s country and the
courage of its people.  Perhaps his country might feel it necessary to
take retaliatory action; but before that was over, there would be not
only dead Americans but dead Russians as well.

He asked me what offer the United States was making, and I told
him of the letter that President Kennedy had just transmitted to
Khrushchev.  He raised the question of our removing the missiles
from Turkey.  I said that there could be no quid pro quo or any
arrangement made under this kind of threat or pressure, and that in
the last analysis this was a decision that would have to be made by
NATO.  However, I said, President Kennedy had been anxious to
remove those missiles from Italy and Turkey for a long period of
time.  He had ordered their removal some time ago, and it was our
judgment that, within a short time after this crisis was over, those
missiles would be gone.

I said President Kennedy wished to have peaceful relations
between our two countries.  He wished to resolve the problems that
confronted us in Europe and Southeast Asia.  He wished to move
forward on the control of nuclear weapons.  However, we could
make progress on these matters only when the crisis was behind us. 
Time was running out.  We had only a few more hours—we needed
an answer immediately from the Soviet Union.  I said we must have
it the next day.

I returned to the White House....

[Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile
Crisis (New York: New American Library, 1969), 107-109.]

* * * * *

Khrushchev’s Description

The climax came after five or six days, when our ambassador to
Washington, Anatoly Dobrynin, reported that the President’s
brother, Robert Kennedy, had come to see him on an unofficial visit. 
Dobrynin’s report went something like this:

“Robert Kennedy looked exhausted.  One could see from his eyes
that he had not slept for days.  He himself said that he had not been
home for six days and nights.  ‘The President is in a grave
situation,’ Robert Kennedy said, ‘and does not know how to get out
of it.  We are under very severe stress.  In fact we are under pressure
from our military to use force against Cuba.  Probably at this very
moment the President is sitting down to write a message to
Chairman Khrushchev.  We want to ask you, Mr. Dobrynin, to pass
President Kennedy’s message to Chairman Khrushchev through
unofficial channels.  President Kennedy implores Chairman
Khrushchev to accept his offer and to take into consideration the
peculiarities of the American system.  Even though the President
himself is very much against starting a war over Cuba, an
irreversible chain of events could occur against his will.  That is
why the President is appealing directly to Chairman Khrushchev for
his help in liquidating this conflict.  If the situation continues much
longer, the President is not sure that the military will not overthrow
him and seize power.  The American army could get out of

[Khrushchev Remembers, intro., commentary, and notes by Edward
Crankshaw, trans. and ed. by Strobe Talbott (Boston: Little, Brown,
1970; citation from paperback edition, New York: Bantam, 1971),
pp. 551-52]

* * * * *

Sorensen’s “Confession”:

...the president [Kennedy] recognized that, for Chairman
Khrushchev to withdraw the missiles from Cuba, it would be
undoubtedly helpful to him if he could say at the same time to his
colleagues on the Presidium, “And we have been assured that the
missiles will be coming out of Turkey.”  And so, after the ExComm
meeting [on the evening of 27 October 1962], as I’m sure almost all
of you know, a small group met in President Kennedy’s office, and
he instructed Robert Kennedy—at the suggestion of Secretary of
State [Dean] Rusk—to deliver the letter to Ambassador Dobrynin
for referral to Chairman Khrushchev, but to add orally what was not
in the letter: that the missiles would come out of Turkey.

Ambassador Dobrynin felt that Robert Kennedy’s book did not
adequately express that the “deal” on the Turkish missiles was part
of the resolution of the crisis.  And here I have a confession to make
to my colleagues on the American side, as well as to others who are
present.  I was the editor of Robert Kennedy’s book.  It was, in fact,
a diary of those thirteen days.  And his diary was very explicit that
this was part of the deal; but at that time it was still a secret even on
the American side, except for the six of us who had been present at
that meeting.  So I took it upon myself to edit that out of his diaries,
and that is why the Ambassador is somewhat justified in saying that
the diaries are not as explicit as his conversation.

[Sorensen comments, in Bruce J. Allyn, James G. Blight, and David
A. Welch, eds., Back to the Brink: Proceedings of the Moscow
Conference on the Cuban Missile Crisis, January 27-28, 1989
(Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1992), pp. 92-93]

* * * * *

Accounts of Former U.S. Officials:

McGeorge Bundy:

... Later [on Saturday], accepting a proposal from Dean Rusk, [John
F.] Kennedy instructed his brother to tell Ambassador Dobrynin that
while there could be no bargain over the missiles that had been
supplied to Turkey, the president himself was determined to have
them removed and would attend to the matter once the present crisis
was resolved—as long as no one in Moscow called that action part
of a bargain. [p. 406]

...The other part of the oral message [to Dobrynin] was proposed by
Dean Rusk; that we should tell Khrushchev that while there could be
no deal over the Turkish missiles, the president was determined to
get them out and would do so once the Cuban crisis was resolved. 
The proposal was quickly supported by the rest of us [in addition to
Bundy and Rusk, those present included President Kennedy,
McNamara, RFK, George Ball, Roswell Gilpatrick, Llewellyn
Thompson, and Theodore Sorensen].  Concerned as we all were by
the cost of a public bargain struck under pressure at the apparent
expense of the Turks, and aware as we were from the day’s
discussion that for some, even in our own closest councils, even this
unilateral private assurance might appear to betray an ally, we
agreed without hesitation that no one not in the room was to be
informed of this additional message.  Robert Kennedy was
instructed to make it plain to Dobrynin that the same secrecy must
be observed on the other side, and that any Soviet reference to our
assurance would simply make it null and void. [pp. 432-44]

...There was no leak.  As far as as I know, none of the nine of us
told anyone else what had happened.  We denied in every forum that
there was any deal, and in the narrowest sense what we said was
usually true, as far as it went.  When the orders were passed that the
Jupiters must come out, we gave the plausible and accurate—if
incomplete—explanation that the missile crisis had convinced the
president once and for all that he did not want those missiles there....
[p. 434]

[from McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices About the
Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York: Random House, 1988]

Dean Rusk:

Even though Soviet ships had turned around, time was running
out.  We made this very clear to Khrushchev.  Earlier in the week
Bobby Kennedy told Ambassador Dobrynin that if the missile were
not withdrawn immediately, the crisis would move into a different
and dangerous military phase.  In his book Khrushchev Remembers,
Khrushchev states that Robert Kennedy told Dobrynin that the
military might take over.  Khrushchev either genuinely
misunderstood or deliberately misused Bobby’s statement. 
Obviously there was never any threat of a military takeover in this
country.  We wondered about Khrushchev’s situation, even whether
some Soviet general or member of the Politburo would put a pistol
to Khrushchev’s head and say, “Mr. Chairman, launch those
missiles or we’ll blow your head off!”

...In framing a response [to Khrushchev’s second letter of
Saturday, October 27], the president, Bundy, McNamara, Bobby
Kennedy, and I met in the Oval Office, where after some discussion
I suggested that since the Jupiters in Turkey were coming out in any
event, we should inform the Russians of this so that this irrelevant
question would not complicate the solution of the missile sites in
Cuba.  We agreed that Bobby should inform Ambassador Dobrynin
orally.  Shortly after we returned to our offices, I telephoned Bobby
to underline that he should pass this along to Dobrynin only as
information, not a public pledge.  Bobby told me that he was then
sitting with Dobrynin and had already talked with him.  Bobby later
told me that Dobrynin called this message “very important

[Dean Rusk as told to Richard Rusk, As I Saw It (New York:
Norton & Co., 1990), pp. 238-240]

* * * * *

Dobrynin’s Cable to the Soviet Foreign Ministry,
27 October 1962:

Making Copies Prohibited
Copy No. 1


Late tonight R. Kennedy invited me to come see him. We talked

The Cuban crisis, R. Kennedy began, continues to quickly
worsen.  We have just received a report that an unarmed American
plane was shot down while carrying out a reconnaissance flight over
Cuba.  The military is demanding that the President arm such planes
and respond to fire with fire.  The USA government will have to do

I interrupted R. Kennedy and asked him, what right American
planes had to fly over Cuba at all, crudely violating its sovereignty
and accepted international norms?  How would the USA have
reacted if foreign planes appeared over its territory?

“We have a resolution of the Organization of American states
that gives us the right to such overflights,” R. Kennedy quickly

I told him that the Soviet Union, like all peace-loving countries,
resolutely rejects such a “right” or, to be more exact, this kind of
true lawlessness, when people who don’t like the social-political
situation in a country try to impose their will on it—a small state
where the people themselves established and maintained [their
system].  “The OAS resolution is a direct violation of the UN
Charter,” I added, “and you, as the Attorney General of the USA,
the highest American legal entity, should certainly know that.”

R. Kennedy said that he realized that we had different
approaches to these problems and it was not likely that we could
convince each other.  But now the matter is not in these differences,
since time is of the essence.  “I want,” R. Kennedy stressed, “to lay
out the current alarming situation the way the president sees it.  He
wants N.S. Khrushchev to know this.  This is the thrust of the
situation now.”

“Because of the plane that was shot down, there is now strong
pressure on the president to give an order to respond with fire if
fired upon when American reconnaissance planes are flying over
Cuba.  The USA can’t stop these flights, because this is the only
way we can quickly get information about the state of construction
of the missile bases in Cuba, which we believe pose a very serious
threat to our national security.  But if we start to fire in response—a
chain reaction will quickly start that will be very hard to stop.  The
same thing in regard to the essence of the issue of the missile bases
in Cuba.  The USA government is determined to get rid of those
bases—up to, in the extreme case, of bombing them, since, I repeat,
they pose a great threat to the security of the USA.  But in response
to the bombing of these bases, in the course of which Soviet
specialists might suffer, the Soviet government will undoubtedly
respond with the same against us, somewhere in Europe.  A real war
will begin, in which millions of Americans and Russians will die. 
We want to avoid that any way we can, I’m sure that the
government of the USSR has the same wish.  However, taking time
to find a way out [of the situation] is very risky (here R. Kennedy
mentioned as if in passing that there are many unreasonable heads
among the generals, and not only among the generals, who are
‘itching for a fight’).  The situation might get out of control, with
irreversible consequences.”

“In this regard,” R. Kennedy said, “the president considers that a
suitable basis for regulating the entire Cuban conflict might be the
letter N.S. Khrushchev sent on October 26 and the letter in response
from the President, which was sent off today to N.S. Khrushchev
through the US Embassy in Moscow.  The most important thing for
us,” R. Kennedy stressed, “is to get as soon as possible the
agreement of the Soviet government to halt further work on the
construction of the missile bases in Cuba and take measures under
international control that would make it impossible to use these
weapons.  In exchange the government of the USA is ready, in
addition to repealing all measures on the “quarantine,” to give the
assurances that there will not be any invasion of Cuba and that other
countries of the Western Hemisphere are ready to give the same
assurances—the US government is certain of this.”

“And what about Turkey?” I asked R. Kennedy.

“If that is the only obstacle to achieving the regulation I
mentioned earlier, then the president doesn’t see any
unsurmountable difficulties in resolving this issue,” replied R.
Kennedy.  “The greatest difficulty for the president is the public
discussion of the issue of Turkey.  Formally the deployment of
missile bases in Turkey was done by a special decision of the
NATO Council.  To announce now a unilateral decision by the
president of the USA to withdraw missile bases from Turkey—this
would damage the entire structure of NATO and the US position as
the leader of NATO, where, as the Soviet government knows very
well, there are many arguments.  In short, if such a decision were
announced now it would seriously tear apart NATO.”

“However, President Kennedy is ready to come to agree on that
question with N.S. Khrushchev, too.  I think that in order to
withdraw these bases from Turkey,” R. Kennedy said, “we need 4-5
months.  This is the minimal amount of time necessary for the US
government to do this, taking into account the procedures that exist
within the NATO framework.  On the whole Turkey issue,” R.
Kennedy added, “if Premier N.S. Khrushchev agrees with what I’ve
said, we can continue to exchange opinions between him and the
president, using him, R. Kennedy and the Soviet ambassador.
“However, the president can’t say anything public in this regard
about Turkey,” R. Kennedy said again.  R. Kennedy then warned
that his comments about Turkey are extremely confidential; besides
him and his brother, only 2-3 people know about it in Washington.

“That’s all that he asked me to pass on to N.S. Khrushchev,” R.
Kennedy said in conclusion.  “The president also asked N.S.
Khrushchev to give him an answer (through the Soviet ambassador
and R. Kennedy) if possible within the next day (Sunday) on these
thoughts in order to have a business-like, clear answer in principle. 
[He asked him] not to get into a wordy discussion, which might
drag things out.  The current serious situation, unfortunately, is such
that there is very little time to resolve this whole issue. 
Unfortunately, events are developing too quickly.  The request for a
reply tomorrow,” stressed R. Kennedy, “is just that—a request, and
not an ultimatum.  The president hopes that the head of the Soviet
government will understand him correctly.”

I noted that it went without saying that the Soviet government
would not accept any ultimatums and it was good that the American
government realized that.  I also reminded him of N.S.
Khrushchev’s appeal in his last letter to the president to demonstrate
state wisdom in resolving this question.  Then I told R. Kennedy that
the president’s thoughts would be brought to the attention of the
head of the Soviet government.  I also said that I would contact him
as soon as there was a reply.  In this regard, R. Kennedy gave me a
number of a direct telephone line to the White House.

In the course of the conversation, R. Kennedy noted that he knew
about the conversation that television commentator Scali had
yesterday with an Embassy adviser on possible ways to regulate the
Cuban conflict [one-and-a-half lines whited out]

I should say that during our meeting R. Kennedy was very upset;
in any case, I’ve never seen him like this before.  True, about twice
he tried to return to the topic of “deception,” (that he talked about so
persistently during our previous meeting), but he did so in passing
and without any edge to it.  He didn’t even try to get into fights on
various subjects, as he usually does, and only persistently returned to
one topic: time is of the essence and we shouldn’t miss the chance.

After meeting with me he immediately went to see the president,
with whom, as R. Kennedy said, he spends almost all his time now.

27/X-62     A. DOBRYNIN

[Source: Russian Foreign Ministry archives, translation from copy
provided by NHK, in Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein,
We All Lost the Cold War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1994), appendix, pp. 523-526, with minor revisions.]

* * * * *

Lebow and Stein comment,
We All Lost the Cold War (excerpt):

The cable testifies to the concern of John and Robert Kennedy
that military action would trigger runaway escalation.  Robert
Kennedy told Dobrynin of his government’s determination to ensure
the removal of the Soviet missiles in Cuba, and his belief that the
Soviet Union “will undoubtedly respond with the same against us,
somewhere in Europe.”  Such an admission seems illogical if the
administration was using the threat of force to compel the Soviet
Union to withdraw its missiles from Cuba.  It significantly raised
the expected cost to the United States of an attack against the
missiles, thereby weakening the credibility of the American threat. 
To maintain or enhance that credibility, Kennedy would have had to
discount the probability of Soviet retaliation to Dobrynin.  That
nobody in the government was certain of Khrushchev’s reponse
makes Kennedy’s statement all the more remarkable.

It is possible that Dobrynin misquoted Robert Kennedy. 
However, the Soviet ambassador was a careful and responsible
diplomat.  At the very least, Kennedy suggested that he thought that
Soviet retaliation was likely.  Such an admission was still damaging
to compellence.  It seems likely that Kennedy was trying to establish
the basis for a more cooperative approach to crisis resolution.  His
brother, he made clear, was under enormous pressure from a coterie
of generals and civilian officials who were “itching for a fight.” 
This also was a remarkable admission for the attorney general to
make.  The pressure on the president to attack Cuba, as Kennedy
explained at the beginning of the meeting, had been greatly
intensified by the destruction of an unarmed American
reconnaissance plane.  The president did not want to use force, in
part because he recognized the terrible consequences of escalation,
and was therefore requesting Soviet assistance to make it

This interpretation is supported by the president’s willingness to
remove the Jupiter missiles as a quid pro quo for the withdrawal of
missiles in Cuba, and his brother’s frank confession that the only
obstacle to dismantling the Jupiters were political.  “Public
discussion” of a missile exchange would damage the United States’
position in NATO.  For this reason, Kennedy revealed, “besides
himself and his brother, only 2-3 people know about it in
Washington.”  Khrushchev would have to cooperate with the
administration to keep the American concession a secret.

Most extraordinary of all is the apparent agreement between
Dobrynin and Kennedy to treat Kennedy’s de facto ultimatum as “a
request, and not an ultimatum.”  This was a deliberate attempt to
defuse as much as possible the hostility that Kennedy’s request for
an answer by the next day was likely to provoke in Moscow.  So too
was Dobrynin’s next sentence: “I noted that it went without saying
that the Soviet government would not accept any ultimatum and it
was good that the American government realized that.”

Prior meetings between Dobrynin and Kennedy had sometimes
degenerated into shouting matches.  On this occasion, Dobrynin
indicates, the attorney general kept his emotions in check and took
the ambassador into his confidence in an attempt to cooperate on the
resolution of the crisis.  This two-pronged strategy succeeded where
compellence alone might have failed.  It gave Khrushchev positive
incentives to remove the Soviet missiles and reduced the emotional
cost to him of the withdrawal.  He responded as Kennedy and
Dobrynin had hoped.

Media Credits

By Jim Hershberg - Article online at The National Security Archive, George Washington University.


Awesome Stories Silver or Gold Membership Required
Awesome Stories Silver or Gold Membership Required
Show tooltips